CRS Probe Blames Wrong Signaling & Previous Inaction For Odisha Train Tragedy

Bhubaneswar/New Delhi: A high-level inquiry has found “wrong signalling” to be the main reason for the triple train accident at Bahanaga Bazar station in Odisha’s Balasore district on June 2, which has so far claimed 293 lives.

The faulty signalling was attributed to two botched repair works, including one in 2018 and the other hours before the accident,  and this sent Coromandel Express on a collision course with a goods train on another track, the independent inquiry report submitted by the Commission of Railway Safety (CRS) to the Railway Board said.

It blamed the mishap to human error during replacement of electric lifting barrier (ELB) for level crossing (LC) gate – 94 at the station five years back.

While flagging “lapses at multiple levels” in the signalling and telecommunication (S&T) department, it further said that the June 2 tragedy could have potentially been avoided had the repeated glitches with the local signalling system been flagged, which could have led the signalling and track staff to trace the mistake that was made in 2018. The station master, who is part of the operations department, has also been named for failing to detect “abnormal behaviour” of the signalling control system.

The report also said that the station-specific approved circuit diagram was not provided for repair-work near the site of the accident that was a “wrong step that led to wrong wiring”, adding that a team of field supervisors modified the wiring diagram but failed to replicate it. The change in names made during the shifting in 2018 was not reflected in the wiring diagram of the cabin.

While the train crash occurred around 6.55 pm, a similar circuit replacement was conducted by a team of four – senior section engineer (SSE-signal) Amir Khan, technician (of Bahanaga) Abinash Ranjan Mohanty, technician (Balasore) Pappu Kumar and SSE signal in-charge AK Mahanta at the same cabin between 4.20 pm and 4.50 pm. “Due to the lapses committed in 2018, the team disconnected wrong wires for the fresh repair work. Unaware about the lapses, they rewired for the new ELB. In the process, the team disconnected the feed coming from the cross over 17A/B to the point detection relay circuit and instead connected another circuit. For this, the indication feed of crossover was disassociated from the status of the track point at the site,” the report stated.

Though Coromandel Express was given signal for Up mainline, the track point was found set for Up loop line which is why the train moved on loop line and derailed after hitting the stationary goods train, it added.

“The accident was a case of rear-collision of 12841 Shalimar-Chennai Coromandel Express with the goods train standing on the up loop line of the station. The last two coaches of train no. 12864 SMVT Bengaluru-Howrah Express, which were passing on the down main line of the station, were hit by the derailed coaches of train no. 12841, and overturned.

The rear collision was due to the lapses in the signalling-circuit alteration carried out at the North Signal Goomty in the past, and during the execution of the singalling work related to the replacement of the ‘electric lifting barrier’ for level-crossing gate no.94 at the station.

These lapses resulted in wrong signalling to train no.12841, due to which the up home signal indicated green for run-through movement of the train on the up main line of the station. But, the crossover connecting the up main line to the up loopline (crossover 17 A/B) was set to the up loopline. The wrong signalling resulted in 12841 traversing on the up loop line and eventual rear collision with the goods train standing there.”

It also referred to a similar incident of mismatch between the intended route set by signals and the actual route taken by a train on May 16, 2022 at Bankranayabaz station in Khargpur Division of South Eastern Railway due to wrong wiring and cable fault.

The CRS report further said that any alteration to signalling circuits should be carried out with an approved circuit diagram, in presence of an officer. A separate team should be deployed for checking and testing of modified signalling circuits and functions before restoration or reconnection work.

In the event of a condition wherein both ‘Normal’ and ‘Reverse’ indication relays are detected for a point, all signal movement over that point should be prevented. In case of Electronic Interlocking, this should be registered as a fault condition, and the system should shut down automatically. If the status of a point indication relay (physical relay) is ‘Normal’ then the command for operation of the point from ‘Reverse’ to ‘Normal’ should not generate and vice-versa, it added.

The report has recommended that a drive should be launched to update the completion signalling wiring diagrams, other documents and lettering of signalling circuits at site. It also pointed out that the initial response to such a disaster should be faster and advised the Railways to review the system of disaster-response in the zonal railways and also the coordination between the zonal railways an various disaster-response forces like NDRF and SDRF.

Notably, the CAG in its latest audit has also flagged glaring safety issues due to a lack of inspections and track maintenance in East Coast Railway (ECoR) that oversees rail operations in Odisha. Special fund Rashtriya Rail Sanraksha Kosh, created in 2017 to improve railway safety, was misused to buy furniture, utensils, crockery, computers and printers, foot massager, develop passenger amenities like lifts and escalators, besides the works in staff quarters and officers rest house, it pointed out.