SC Questions Centre Over Blanket Ban On Training For Pregnant IPS Probationers

SC Questions Centre Over Blanket Ban On Training For Pregnant IPS Probationers

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New Delhi: The Supreme Court, on Wednesday, questioned the Centre over a 1993 government policy that bars pregnant Indian Police Service (IPS) probationers from undergoing training till a year after delivery, even if she is fit.

A beneficiary provision introduced for women cannot be used to deny them opportunities if they are medically fit, the Court observed.

Seeking the Centre’s response by Thursday, the Court asked it to clarify whether the petitioner, IPS officer Urvashi Sengar, could be permitted to join the Phase-II training programme, which commenced in June this year.

“This is a beneficiary provision under law for protection of women and not to take away the right to undergo training if they are fit for it,” the bench observed while examining the validity of the Ministry of Home Affairs’ 1993 Office Memorandum (OM).

“When the purpose of this OM is to enable training of a fit woman, then why are you stopping her if she is fit,” the Court asked, as reported by NDTV.

A blanket rule may not be appropriate, the bench said, noting that while some women may be fit to resume training within nine months of childbirth, others may require much longer. It indicated that such cases should be assessed individually rather than through a rigid policy.

The Centre, however, opposed any relaxation of the policy, arguing that granting relief in one case could open the floodgates for similar claims.

The petitioner’s counsel told the Court that exceptions had been granted in two such cases in the past, with women officers being permitted to continue or resume training despite the 1993 policy.

The constitutional validity of the 1993 Office Memorandum issued by


the Ministry of Home Affairs, which directs women IPS probationers to avoid conceiving during their training period, has been challenged in the petition. It mandates that if an officer becomes pregnant, her training must be stopped immediately.

The officer is required to remain out of training for one year after childbirth, after which training resumes, as per the policy. The period is treated as extraordinary leave and does not affect seniority.

The Supreme Court is examining whether such a blanket prohibition can continue to operate in light of advances in medical science and constitutional guarantees of equality, or whether decisions should instead be based on individual medical assessment and fitness.

Urvashi, a 2023-batch direct recruit IPS officer allotted the Madhya Pradesh cadre, joined the Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel National Police Academy for Phase-I training in November 2023.

She became pregnant and informed the authorities while undergoing Phase-II training in April 2025. This phase primarily comprises classroom sessions, academic modules and institutional attachments.

She delivered her child on September 20, 2025. With the next Phase-II training scheduled to begin on June 20, 2026 – around nine months after childbirth – she sought permission to join, stating that she was medically fit.

The academy, however, declined her request, citing the 1993 Office Memorandum, and informed her that she could join only with the next batch.

Urvashi then approached the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), which, in an interim order on May 27, allowed her to participate in the training subject to medical fitness and other formalities.

Although the police academy initially issued a letter on June 16 permitting her to join, it withdrew the communication within two days. The Centre subsequently challenged the CAT’s order before the Delhi High Court, which stayed the tribunal’s direction on June 22, observing that the policy was intended to safeguard the welfare of both the IPS probationer and the infant.

Urvashi argued before the Supreme Court that the 1993 policy does not distinguish between physically intensive and academic phases of training and fails to account for modern training practices, reasonable accommodation and constitutional principles of substantive gender equality.


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