The ghastly train tragedy at Bahanaga has so far claimed 288 lives and left more than 1,000 injured, of whom around 100 are still in critical condition. There are 80-odd bodies which are still to be identified.
Most of the dead and injured were migrant labourers who were travelling in the general coaches.
The accident is being probed by three agencies – Commissioner Railway Safety, Government Railway Police and Central Bureau of Investigation. While it is not proper to say anything specific about the accident when investigation is underway, it is pertinent to do a soul search on the working of Indian Railways in general and, safety concerns, in particular.
Prima facie, it has been established that something went wrong with the Electronic Interlocking System, which governs setting of routes and giving signals to operate trains at the station.
On the ill-fated day, though the signal was given to Coromandel Express to pass through the main line, it entered the loop line and dashed into an iron ore-laden goods train at a speed of 128 kmph. The impact was so heavy that 17 trailing coaches were thrown out off track. The Yeshvanthpur-Howrah Express, which was passing from the opposite direction, rammed into some of those Coromandel coaches, causing derailment and tumbling of three coaches.
The question arises — how was the route set to the already-occupied loop line though signal was for the main line? Left to the system itself, it will not allow such a combination. But manual interference can make this possible. Many such cases of interference have happened in the past. In some cases accidents were averted due to prompt action of staff like loco pilot, station master or any other staff involved in train operation, while others led to accidents of different degrees of severity.
Now, the question is — why does such manual interference take place? It is basically to manipulate failure statistics, which is taken seriously in the Railways. Any failure affecting Railway operation is recorded. Failure not affecting movement is neither noticed nor recorded. Therefore, the maintenance staff adopt shortcut ways to deal with such failures instead of following the procedure laid down to deal with a failure.
This tendency is more when a failure occurs in the case of an important Mail/Express train, as top management views failures leading to loss of punctuality of important trains seriously. To some extent, manual manipulation has been controlled by putting the relay rooms containing vital central parts of the electronic interlocking systems under double custody and by logging each entry to the relay room through the system. But all the field equipment and systems are still open to manual interference and this is where further work is needed so as to make the system tamper-proof.
The Electronic Interlocking system has been in use in Indian Railways for more than two decades. But the technology is yet to be absorbed by the system. Even today, Railways depends on the OEMs for making small modifications to EI systems which arise due to minor changes in yards or changes in the rules of operation. This costs the Railway handsomely (EI prices are oligopoly driven).
To add to this, the staff neither learns the system nor innovates. Why such state of affairs continues is anybody’s guess! Railways has no dearth of competent signalling engineers. In fact, off the job many such engineers are on the rolls of the OEMs. Therefore, it is urgent to open development cells at each division to quickly adopt this technology and acquire an upper hand over the OEMs.
The EI maintenance arrangement at small roadside stations is skeletal. Most of them have only one maintainer or trained khalasi. He is available on call. This puts tremendous pressure on the system at the time of failure and breeds a tendency to go for short cut. Absorption of technology and upgradation of manpower shall go a long way in preventing failures and capping the motive to bypass systems. Further, the procedure laid down for running trains at the time of signal failure needs manpower which is not available at the roadside stations. Therefore, the person in charge of train operation also seeks a short cut at the time of failure.
There is an urgent need to augment operating manpower at the roadside stations.
In the Railways, there is a tendency to hide accidents from top to bottom in its echelons. Many inconsequential accidents are neither reported nor probed for meaningful disciplinary action and system improvements. This leads to a situation where things are taken for granted. Short cuts become routine and staff become overconfident, resulting in disasters.
Even accidents which are reported and investigated don’t yield trustworthy reports and follow up actions. There is always a tendency to blame one another. In some cases, sabotage is brought into the picture to save the government. Punishments imposed by the disciplinary authority on guilty staff seldom conform to norms specified in accident manuals and they get further diluted at appeal and review stage of the proceedings.
There is a need to strictly follow the accident manual as far as reporting and follow-up of accidents are concerned. Any deviation should call for exemplary disciplinary action.
There is a discussion as to whether ‘Kavach’ — the anti-collision device could have averted the disaster. Yes, it would have, since the train was coming on a blocked line, though signal was for the main line. Again, here it can be bypassed. There is no substitute to discipline and diligence which can be ensured through time-tested surprise and meaningful inspections.
As said in the beginning, in case of a disaster like this, the worst sufferers are the poor — mainly the migratory labourers who travel in general coaches packed to dense-crush capacity. In olden days, Railway used to run all General Class Janta express trains for this class, on which the urban masses are so dependent. But those trains are no more.
There is a tendency to replace general compartments by AC coaches during summer rush. There is also a thinking that the general coaches are unremunerative and largely occupied by ticketless passengers. Such thinking prevails at the top of the administration, which has lost touch with the field.
In fact, general coaches in long-distance trains bring the highest return to Railways, as each coach carries 200 to 250 passengers (sometimes going up to 300) and each of them carry a ticket. People occupy every possible space in the coach including the toilet. They carry empty bottles to urinate into when it becomes impossible to go to the toilet to attend to call of nature.
In one incident, a general coach which was gutted was brought to a workshop for investigation into the cause of fire. When the ceiling of the coach was opened, some plastic bottles containing urine were recovered!
Therefore it is time for Railways to become humane and bring adequate facility to carry these passengers on which the urban population and agriculture in some states are grossly dependent. Certainly, Vande Bharat is not the train for these poor passengers!
(Hemanta Kumar Dutta is A Retired Principal Chief Safety Officer, East Coast Railway)
