Bhubaneswar: The BJP and its leaders frequently indulge in opposition-bashing, often relying on a mix of half-truths, outright lies, and shallow inferences. The intellectual bankruptcy of the party was laid bare once again by Nishikant Dubey’s recent foot-in-mouth remark about Biju Patnaik. While speaking to reporters in New Delhi, he alleged that former PM Jawaharlal Nehru had fought the 1962 war against China with American money and in collaboration with CIA agents. He specifically named Biju Patnaik as the “link” between the US government, the CIA, and Nehru. Dubey further claimed that Biju Babu had helped the CIA operate U-2 spy planes from the Charbatia air base in Odisha.
The real story of Biju Patnaik’s role as Nehru’s defence advisor is far more nuanced and has been documented in detail in my book on Biju Patnaik.
The American Secret Agency CIA had always maintained an extensive dossier on Biju Patnaik. He features in numerous memoirs written by former bureau chiefs, diplomats, and operatives. Like many other anti-communist leaders friendly to the United States, Biju was closely watched — and cultivated — by American intelligence.
Biju Patnaik’s role in setting up the Aviation Research Centre at Charbatia and his reported visit to CIA headquarters are well documented in Kenneth Conboy and James Morrison’s authoritative book, ‘The CIA’s Secret War in Tibet’.
During the height of the Cold War, in April 1963, US Ambassador John Kenneth Galbraith made the first official request to India for a base for the U-2 spy planes. Despite intense and persistent American persuasion, Nehru ultimately turned down the proposal.
In March 1963, Biju Patnaik, then serving as Nehru’s defence advisor, was sent to Washington. He held discussions with the Pentagon, and his interviews with The Washington Post and The Baltimore Sun created ripples back home in India. There are also reports that he paid a secret visit to the CIA headquarters at Langley.
On June 3, 1963, John F Kennedy met President Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan at White House and reiterated the CIA’s request for the U-2 base. After Radhakrishnan’s return, Nehru discussed the matter with Biju Patnaik. The Americans had lobbied hard with Biju, who was keen to establish the facility at Charbati. Everything appeared set for approval, but Nehru turned down the proposal at the eleventh hour. A dejected Galbraith met Biju Patnaik, who by then had resigned under the Kamaraj plan.
Nehru’s objection was based on the advice of Intelligence Bureau (IB) chief B N Mullick. He asked Nehru to insist that all film shot by the U-2 planes must be processed in India, with one complete set of photographs retained by the Indian side. The CIA countered that each sortie produced hundreds of miles of film, making it impractical to set up the necessary technical facilities in India at short notice. They offered instead to share processed imagery later, but Mullick remained unmoved. Nehru stood his ground, even after Biju Patnaik pressed the case.
In May 1963, T T Krishnamachari, the powerful minister in Nehru’s Cabinet, visited the US, where officials persuaded him to send a long cable urging Nehru to reconsider the U-2 base. Nehru ticked him off with a curt “please do not meddle in this”.
A disappointed Galbraith left India in June 1963. He had lobbied hard with Biju to secure the U-2 base, making nearly half a dozen trips, both secret and official, to Bhubaneswar to meet him. During one such visit, he stayed at the BNR Hotel in Puri, signed the visitors’ book, and praised the hotel.
His successor, Chester Bowles, was thoroughly briefed about Biju’s close proximity to Nehru. Among the unfinished items on Bowles’ agenda were two major projects Galbraith had pushed: a Voice of America (VOA) transmitter and the Bokaro Steel Plant.
In 1963, Nehru had agreed in principle to allow a VOA transmitter in eastern India to counter Chinese propaganda. On Biju’s insistence, Odisha was was shortlisted as a possible location, even though the Americans preferred the North-East. The proposed arrangement allowed the Americans limited operational access while the facility would remain under Indian control, an arrangement that stretched the spirit of non-alignment. When news of the plan leaked, the Indian media and opposition raised a hue and cry. There were nay-sayers within Nehru’s Cabinet too.
Biju Patnaik vehemently supported the project, but Nehru eventually shelved it, citing the Americans’ reluctance to have the facility fully staffed by Indians. Nehru’s flip-flop resulted in America’s backing off from Bokaro Steel Plant too. Despite the fact that Kennedy was keen to give financial support for the steel mill, the US Congress turned it down.
In November 1963, Chester Bowles was summoned to Washington by Kennedy. The President had agreed to a substantial arms aid package worth $375 million over five years, following discussions between Bowles, Biju Patnaik, and Defence Minister Y B Chavan.
In his memoirs, Bowles recalled that a pleased Kennedy had scheduled a meeting with him for November 26, a day before Bowles was to return to India, to finalise the approval. That meeting never took place. President Kennedy was assassinated on November 22, 1963.
Biju Patnaik once again took up the Charbatia base matter with both Mullick and Nehru. A reluctant Nehru, on Biju’s insistence, agreed to allow American U-2 planes to overfly Indian territory and use Charbatia for refuelling. The CIA resumed its spy missions from Thailand’s Takhli air base.
According to declassified U-2 programme documents obtained by the National Security Archive under the Freedom of Information Act, these secret flights provided India with critical intelligence on the nature and extent of Chinese incursions.
Eventually, Biju Patnaik succeeded in persuading Nehru to allow a full U-2 base at Charbatia after he convinced the Americans to establish a film-processing laboratory in India. A huge complex with 30 air-conditioned flats was built to house nearly 60 CIA technicians who worked round-the-clock. The facility still exists and was later used for processing imagery from India’s own reconnaissance aircraft. In today’s era of satellite technology, it has become largely redundant.
The first mission from Charbatia took place on May 24, 1964. Three days later, Nehru passed away, and further operations were temporarily suspended. The pilots and aircraft returned to Thailand, but the technicians remained.
In December 1964, as tensions with China flared again, Detachment G returned to Charbatia and conducted three highly successful missions. The role of the Americans spy planes during the Chinese debacle has never been told. The setting up of Establishment 22 in Charbatia, comprising the Khampa rebels and Biju Patnaik’s role in it is the matter of another chapter in this book.
The high regard in which the Americans held Biju Patnaik is evident from declassified CIA and US Embassy documents released a few years ago. On January 14, 1964, a telegram from the American Embassy at Delhi, sent to the State Department, revealed that Nehru had suffered a coronary thrombosis resulting in partial paralysis. The following day, Ambassador Bowles sent a detailed report on the intense succession race that had erupted. He mentioned that the Krishna Menon-Madan Mohan Malaviya group was hell-bent on propping up Indira Gandhi as as their preferred candidate. While Gulzari Lal Nanda had already begun to chair the Cabinet meetings, Bowles wrote that T T Krishnamachari, Morarji Desai and S K Patil were the other strong contenders.
Chester Bowles wrote: “Biju Patnaik was a strong possibility for the future. However at present he is too much of an opportunist with no clear-cut political philosophy. Governor Khosla with whom I spent two days in Orissa recently and who knew Patnaik well in his role as Chief Minister said he was in many ways the ablest man of the coming generation in India but he was not ready for the top job as his perspective has not been clarified. At that moment Khosla was inclined to think he would be dangerous, unpredictable and easily swept off his feet. However this tendency might diminish as he gained more experience and it is possible that Patnaik might emerge as a constructive and effective force.”
The other irritant in the Indo-US relationship was the American policy towards Kashmir. In the 1960s, the USA actively sought to facilitate a settlement through various channels, including the UN Security Council. Washington never fully endorsed a plebiscite or an international conference. Instead, it consistently advocated for direct dialogue between India and Pakistan, while viewing the people of Kashmir as important stakeholders in any final resolution. The US treated the entire territory of Jammu and Kashmir as disputed, on both sides of the Line of Control.
In the early 1990s, Kashmir witnessed mass resistance against the Indian forces and Pakistan internationalised the issue. The United States maintained its position. On March 6, 1990, Assistant Secretary of State John H Kelly testified before the Asia-Pacific sub-committee of the House of Representatives thus: “United States considers Jammu and Kashmir a disputed territory”. He urged both the countries to settle it according to the Shimla agreement. Subsequently, US Ambassador to Pakistan, Robert Oakley, asked both the countries to “take into account the needs of the people of Kashmir.” The statement marked the beginning of the USA’s shift on the Kashmir issue.
During this period, Chandrashekhar was Prime Minister and Biju Patnaik was Chief Minister of Odisha. Chandrashekhar discussed the Kashmir issue with Biju during a visit to Bhubaneswar. Even his successor, P V Narasimha Rao, who was elected from Berhampur in southern Odisha in 1992, frequently sought Biju Patnaik’s counsel on matters involving the United States.
In 1996, when elections were announced in Kashmir, US Ambassador Frank G Wisner actively promoted the idea and personally met several Hurriyat Conference leaders to encourage their participation. When the separatist leaders expressed reluctance to take the oath of allegiance to the Indian Constitution, Wisner reportedly assured them that India might not insist on it if they agreed to contest. Both Pakistan and the Hurriyat strongly criticised Wisner’s campaign, and large sections of Kashmiris boycotted the polls.
In early March 1996, while Biju Patnaik was in Delhi, a newspaper headline caught his eye in his suite at Odisha Bhavan: “Free and fair polls in Kashmir necessary — Wisner.” Infuriated, he immediately called Wisner and sharply rebuked him for “messing around in the internal affairs of our country”. Wisner, well aware of Biju’s long-standing relationship with the United States, listened quietly and then invited him to lunch the next day at Roosevelt House, the Ambassador’s residence. Biju accepted the invitation, but what exactly transpired during that meeting remains unknown.(Extracted from my book “Biju Patnaik: India’s Last Buccaneer”)
